Journal of Public Management & Social Policy

Fall 2017 / Spring 2018

Conditions for Competition:
Assessing the Competitive
Dynamics of US Counties
Joshua L. Mitchell
University of Arkansas
LaShonda Stewart
John A. Hamman
Southern Illinois University
Steve Modlin
The National Coalition of Independent Scholars
Research in public policy examines specific theories that drive policy adoption among
jurisdictions. One of these theories, referred to in the economics literature as economic
competition (or strategic competition), posits that local governments may engage in
competition with one another because of the potential interjurisdictional economic spillover
effects of certain fiscal policies. In this article, sales tax rates, a common, yet overlooked,
policy instrument in the policy literature is examined to determine if sales tax rates drive
competition among counties. Testing several hypotheses, this study finds that sales tax rate
increases can exacerbate competition among counties. However, this relationship is
conditional on the per capita county income; more specifically, poorer counties are more
vulnerable to the effects of economic competition than wealthier counties. Furthermore,
many other processes influence sales tax increases, depending on how the process is
modeled. Thus, economic competition is a multidimensional process shaped by a multitude
of factors.

R

ecent research in public policy has turned with greater frequency towards local
governments when examining policy diffusion (Godwin and Schroedel, 2000; Rincke, 2007;
Swarts and Vassi, 2011; Shipan and Volden, 2006; Bouché and Volden 2011; Zhang and
Yang, 2008; Boushey, 2010; Butz, Fix, and Mitchell, 2015) or the underlying processes
driving policy adoption among multiple jurisdictions. This allows scholars to test multiple
theories that explain this underlying process, or what some scholars refer to as diffusion
mechanisms (Shipan and Volden, 2008). However, despite these efforts, only a few studies
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(e.g., Bouché and Volden, 2011) have examined diffusion among counties. Local
policymakers often have the discretion to adopt local sales taxes, but most diffusion studies
focus on tax policy at the state level (Berry and Berry, 1992, 1994; Chirinko and Wilson,
2013; Goel and Nelson, 2012). Diffusion scholars have traditionally thought of states as
policy laboratories (e.g., Karch, 2007) and have thus given most of their attention to states.
However, counties also adopt policies, face various fiscal pressures, have policymakers who
answer to their constituents, are cognizant of the policies of others (e.g., Bouché and Volden,
2011), have some degree of autonomy (contingent upon the state in which the county is
located), and can provide important clues regarding the consequences of the devolution of
policies from states to local governments. However, in the economics literature, fiscal
interaction, or how economic decisions made by one jurisdiction influence other
jurisdictions (or more specifically, how these decisions drive inter-local government
strategic competition), has been studied for decades at the local level. Taking cues from both
the diffusion and economics literature, this study fills the void in the diffusion literature by
examining if and how sales tax rate increases drive economic competition among counties.
The study uses data on Missouri’s 114 counties between the years 2004-2010 to test multiple
economic competition hypotheses. In addition, this study analyzes internal factors, or those
that also may make policy adoption more likely (Berry and Berry, 1990; Boehmke and
Witmer, 2004; Walker, 1969; Sabatier and Weible, 2007; Welch and Thompson, 1980).
The next section provides the literature review, followed by a discussion of the
results, along with their implications and the shortcomings of this study.
Fiscal Competition and Sales Tax Decisions
Benjamin Franklin, in a 1789 letter to Jean-Baptiste Leroy, wrote, “In this world
nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes” (Franklin, 2008). This reasoning
is simple: all governments engage in taxation, as it is the primary means by which they
generate revenue. Moreover, it is policymakers’ fundamental task to adjust the tax rate
because they use “their ability to tax and spend to achieve policy goals and objectives” (Kraft
and Furlong, 2004, 89). The reason jurisdictions adjust tax rates may be as simple as
generating revenue, or for other internally motivated tasks, such as adjusting for deficits,
improving infrastructure, or funding new capital projects. However, external stimuli or
factors that rest outside of the jurisdiction, such as a neighboring government’s fiscal policy,
may also determine adjustments. While taxes are important to both local and state
governments, there is substantial variation among state tax laws, the latitude that states give
local governments to change their tax rates, and the frequency of the usage of the sales tax.
Policy Diffusion
For decades, scholars have investigated how policy adoption impacts federalism and
intergovernmental relations, with the more recent research empirically examining fiscal
interactions among local governments (Revelli, 2005). Fiscal interaction is defined as how
decisions made by one jurisdiction influence other jurisdictions economically, either in the
form of economic spillovers where neighbors take advantage of capital inflow provided by
their neighbors, or in the form of fiscal interdependence among jurisdictions—or when the
tax base in one jurisdiction is contingent on the tax rate in others (Brueckner and Saavedra,
2001). Though there are several forms of taxation, the most popular tax for policymakers is
the sales tax, which provides a substantial portion of revenue for state and local
governments. Other taxes include property taxes, incomes taxes, and various other taxes (oil,
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fees, charges, etc.). These account for the largest source of state and local government
revenues.
Often, the sales tax is the preferred form of taxation due to its lack of transparency
to consumers and lower likelihood of electoral retaliation, and also because it is a tax based
on consumption rather than a general tax (Smith et al., 2005). However, placing a sales tax
increase on the ballot can be challenging for a jurisdiction due to limitations imposed on
local governments by the states. However, it is often essential to raise money for projects or
in times of fiscal shortfalls.
Missouri, the focus of this study, has a multi-tiered sales tax. State statutes set
procedures that permit local governments to periodically adopt sales taxes and set rates by
local referendum. This results in varying levels of sales taxes among local governments
(Burge and Piper, 2011; National Conference of State Legislatures, 2008). Although
Missouri law allows flexibility for local governments that have an interest in obtaining
additional revenues from the sales tax, there is a limitation of 1 percent of all taxable retail
property in that particular county. Furthermore, counties have to provide an implementation
and expiration date, the ballot results, and the stated purpose of the tax (MO.R.S.66.600.1
1991). Counties have used the tax for many purposes, such as storm water/drainage
improvements, utility improvements, more funding for emergency services and 911
operations, as well as for economic development. In many cases, the taxes also have
discretionary uses, with remitted monies going into the general fund (Missouri Department
of Revenue, 2015).
To further add complexity to the issue, adjusting a sales tax rate may lead to
jurisdictional interdependence in the form of strategic tax competition, which recognizes
that jurisdictions look to other jurisdictions and choose their tax rates in a strategic manner.
Thus, if a jurisdiction raises its tax rate, neighboring jurisdictions may benefit if this leads
to an inflow in capital for them (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001), and most policymakers
recognize that raising taxes may ultimately lead to a decrease in its tax base (Wilson, 1999;
Brueckner, 2003). However, sales tax rate increases are fairly common within a jurisdiction,
which poses the question of how sales tax rate increases influence neighboring jurisdictions.
For example, in 2005, 10 percent of counties altered their sales tax rates. However, in the
recession years, this percentage increased.
External and Internal Determinants of Local Sales Tax Rates
Previous research has examined interstate tax competition (Fletcher and Murray,
2006; Deskins ad Hill, 2010; Chirinko and Wilson, 2013), how counties react to local option
sales tax rate increases (Luna and Bruce, 2007), why counties seek the local option sales tax
(Green 2014), and county and municipal sales tax options (Burge and Pipe, 2012). Several
studies found that tax rate decisions are often a function of a neighbor’s tax rates (Luna and
Bruce, 2007; Chirinko and Wilson 2013) and that there are substantial levels of
interdependency among neighboring jurisdictions in local sales tax adoptions (Sjoquist et
al., 2007). Furthermore, studies have looked specifically at the diffusion of state income tax
and state sales tax (Berry and Berry, 1992, 1994), enterprise zones (Mossberger, 2000), tax
apportionment policies (Omer and Shelley, 2004), and development and research tax credits
(Miller and Richard 2010). However, there is minimal research on sales tax rate increases
and how they may drive competition and diffusion among counties.
Policy diffusion refers to the subsequent patterns by which policy innovations spread
to other jurisdictions (Walker, 1969; Berry and Berry, 1990; Shipan and Volden, 2006).
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Diffusion consists of external factors that help explain why multiple jurisdictions adopt the
same policy, while internal factors are those that are within a jurisdiction, such as
demographic or social factors. Though there are several external theories of policy diffusion,
scholars often find that economic competition influences policy diffusion (Berry and
Baybeck, 2005), especially for policies that may potentially produce economic spillovers
into other jurisdictions. The economic competition hypothesis for cities is that “the
likelihood of a city adopting a policy decreases with negative economic spillovers from that
adoption to nearby cities and increases with spillovers from nearby cities” (Shipan and
Volden, 2006, 842). The same impact could also be seen in geographically contiguous
counties. More specifically, “In the context of US counties, geographically neighboring
counties are more likely to compete with each other in order to attract or deter positive and
negative economic spillovers than are those counties that do not border upon one another”
(Bouché and Volden, 2011, 433).
According to economic competition theory in diffusion, when policymakers have
comparable sales tax rates to their neighbors, ceteris paribus, there is minimal concern for
economic spillovers or capital outflow. If one county increases its sales tax rate, there can
be an outflow of residents into other counties with lower sales tax rates to make purchases,
especially if residents perceive the difference in sales tax rates as justifying the cost of
traveling to the neighboring county. Even if residents are too far from a county border to
make the trip cost-beneficial, the perception of the capital outflow that may occur if sales
taxes are raised might weigh heavily in the decision-making calculus of policymakers.
However, despite the potential loss of revenue through economic outflow, sales tax increases
do produce revenue, and local governments do implement sales tax increases frequently. In
this case, neighboring counties face the choice of raising their sales tax or not. For the former
choice, counties may raise their sales tax due to lessening concern for losing their residents
to the neighboring counties. In other words, if a county’s neighbor increases its sales tax
rate, the county may raise its own as well, due to having less concern about economic
outflow. As additional neighbors adopt the increased sales tax, the degree of concern would
become even lower, making it more likely that a county would adopt an increase. Based on
this literature, the present article hypothesizes that a county will become increasingly likely
to raise its sales tax rate as neighboring counties raise their rates (Competition Hypothesis).
The impact of a county’s neighbors raising their sales tax rates may not be
contemporaneous. Often, scholars of diffusion examine the impact of time on this process.
The “temporal effects” hypothesis states that various mechanisms of diffusion may display
temporal variance (Shipan and Volden, 2008). According to this hypothesis, for economic
competition, the effects may be long term (Shipan and Volden, 2008), and it may take
counties time to react to the policies of their neighbors. If a county’s neighbors adopt a sales
tax rate increase, the county in question may take time to consider raising its rates. For
example, a county’s policymakers may take time to see if their county obtains revenue
outflow from other counties, or they may simply wait for feedback from other counties or
policymakers. Therefore, this study hypothesizes that there is a delayed diffusion effect
between a county adopting a sales tax rate increase and neighboring adoptions (Spatial
Lagged Competition Hypothesis). An additional consideration arises when recognizing that
local sales tax adoptions and/or rates changes require referendums in Missouri. Therefore,
it is also important to consider how referendums affect adoption. Most diffusion theories
consider the policymakers themselves (Pachecho, 2012) and not the citizens. According to
the social contagion model, citizens themselves react to neighboring policies by changing
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their aggregated opinion on that policy. If this opinion is in favor of the policy, policymakers
respond by adopting it (Pachecho, 2012). Therefore, in this research, neighboring counties
are expected to influence the sales tax of a particular county. Specifically, as other counties
adopt a sales tax rate change, it will cause the county in question to be more likely to pass a
referendum to adopt its own sales tax rate change (Referendum Hypothesis).
This study also tests a conditional hypothesis to assess the extent to which economic
competition varies between counties. A conditional hypothesis tests how external
determinants vary based on internal characteristics. The conditional model posits that
counties are more or less prone to competition based on certain levels of a given
characteristic (Shipan and Volden, 2008), such as the economic wealth and development of
a county. Specifically, this study examines the per capita income of individual counties’
residents to determine how that shapes the influence of neighbors on sales tax rate increases.
This tests the notion that wealthier counties are not as competitive as poorer counties, and
counties with a smaller tax base are going to be more sensitive to the actions of neighboring
counties. Based on this study, this article hypothesizes that wealthier counties will be less
responsive to the sales tax rate increases of neighboring counties than poorer counties will
be (Conditional Competition Income Hypothesis). Additionally, this study examines a
conditional retail model. This model posits that, as the retail sales tax rate increases, the
neighboring counties will be more likely to increase their own sales tax rate to capture
neighboring revenue (Conditional Competition Retail Hypothesis). The study includes a
model that examines the determinants of the sales tax rate. Rather than neighboring counties
influencing a rate change, neighboring counties will influence a county’s sales tax rate (Sales
Tax Rate Hypothesis). Finally, this article includes a model that ascertains the magnitude of
change for each county between each year or, in other words, the specific increase or
decrease in sales tax rates for each year (Sales Tax Rate Change Hypothesis).
Methodology
Missouri is an ideal location for this study due to its similarity to other US states. For
example, its population growth rate and density are near the average of other states (U.S.
Census Bureau 2012). Missouri is also situated in the Midwest, is bordered by seven other
states, and has a diverse spectrum of counties with a mixture of urban and rural areas.
Missouri has four large metropolitan counties: St. Louis, Jefferson, St. Charles, and Greene
(Missouri Census Data Center 2012). In Missouri, counties increase sales tax rates several
times a year, including the first day of every quarter (every January, April, July, and
October), so there is adequate variation in tax rate increases for this study (Missouri
Department of Revenue, 2012).
To test the hypotheses proposed in the previous section, a number of different models
were used. The first is a negative binomial regression for the competition model because the
dependent variable (the number of sales tax rate changes adopted by counties) is an event
count distribution. Since the model has significant evidence for over dispersion (p<.001),
the negative binomial regression model is preferred over the Poisson model. Fixed effects
are also included in the model to capture any yearly effects. Adding the annual dummy
variables controls for the temporal and group effects. In addition, a robust variance estimate
was included in order to adjust for inner-cluster correlation and repeated observations.
Clustering adjusts the variance estimate of the model that would be biased because of
repeated observations. Additional models were used, such as the zero-based negative
binomial, and they all yielded similar results. A zero-inflated negative binomial model to
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control for the large amount of zeros in this model was included. Moreover, for the
referendum model, a Cox Proportion Hazards model was used. This model is typical in
diffusion models where adoption is a one-time event. Finally, ordinary least squares
regression was used for the sales tax rate change model, since the dependent variable is
continuous.
Tests for multicollinearity were done to assure that the independent variables were
not related to one another, which can be problematic in panel data. Data obtained were for
Missouri’s 114 counties during the years 2004-2010.
Dependent Variable
This study relies on several dependent variables. For competition (both primary and
zero-inflated) models, the dependent variable is the total cumulative number of increases
that occurred in a county’s sales tax rate each year. For the lagged model, the dependent
variable is lagged by one year. For the referendum model, a duration model was used, which
is a binary sequence indicating 0 for each year a county did not adjust its tax rate, and 1 for
each year that it did. Ideally, researchers would want to capture the specific date the
referendum was passed. However, because these data were not available, this study relies
on the year the sales tax rate changed as a proxy measure. Additionally, for the sales tax rate
model, a dependent variable that is the current tax rate for each county in Missouri was used.
The data for this variable were obtained from the Missouri Department of Revenue. Finally,
for the sales tax rate change model, the total change in sales tax rate in the current year from
the previous year was used. For example, if county a in 2007 had a sales tax rate of 5.5, and,
in 2006, it was 5.7, the dependent variable would be coded as -.2 for 2007.
Independent Variables
External Factors
The neighbor variable is defined as the proportion of bordering counties that
increased their sales tax rate in the previous year. For example, in 2006, if a particular county
had two neighbors that increased their sales tax rate in 2005, and this county has five total
neighbors, then this was coded as “.40.” Presumably, the higher the proportion of
neighboring counties that have adopted a sales tax rate increase in previous years, the more
likely the county is to adopt due to economic competition.
Internal Factors
The population of a jurisdiction can have an impact on the type and the number of
policies it pursues (Mintrom and Sandra, 1998; Eyestone, 1977; Strang and Tuma, 1993),
and it can also be a determinant or corollary of the financial capacity of the jurisdiction.
Additionally, population is often included in studies that examine economic competition
among local governments (e.g., Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Chirinko and Wilson, 2013).
Presumably, larger counties may exhibit different policy behaviors than smaller counties
because larger counties may adopt policies with greater frequency due to the county having
more policymakers, greater amounts of resources in the county (such as a larger tax base),
differing citizen demands, or a more professional government capable of evaluating policy
alternatives. Furthermore, larger counties may be less likely to respond to their neighbors’
policies because policymakers perceive smaller counties as less of an economic competitor.
Likewise, counties with smaller populations would likely adopt policies less frequently or
may be less responsive to their neighbors’ policies.
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There is some variation in population among Missouri counties. Some counties hold
the major cities (including Springfield, Kansas City, and St. Louis), some are suburbs
located on the outskirts of major cities, while others are largely rural. For the most part,
Missouri is comprised of counties that are lowly populated; therefore, population must be
included as an internal policy determinant in the diffusion models used in this study. This
allows larger metropolitan counties to be compared to the smaller rural counties. To measure
population, the total number of citizens residing in a county in a given year was used. This
variable is logged because its distribution is not normal; counties housing the larger
metropolitan areas had larger populations than average counties. These data were obtained
from the Missouri Census Data Center, which provides yearly population estimates of
counties in Missouri. This variable was used to control for the effect of population on sales
tax rate increases.
States and local governments alike receive federal funding (whether in the form of
appropriations, matching funds, grants, or other forms of revenue) directly from the federal
government. The federal government, in turn, can impact policy adoption by lower
governments through the use of funding structures or various economic incentives. Even if
the federal government did not directly offer “direct incentives and punishments” (Mahalley
et al. 2004, 336), it can still influence policymaking by sending signals about its policy
preferences. Scholars have found that budgetary incentives do influence policy adoption and
diffusion (Welch and Thompson, 1980), and that the federal government can use budgetary
mechanisms to influence states (DiMaggio, 1991; Jensen, 2004; Baum and Oliver, 1996).
Less is known about local governments and the extent to which the federal government can
impact local policies. However, federal spending may impact local governments indirectly
or could be related to other economic aspects of the county. For example, those counties
with a higher tax base could have a greater financial need and are more likely to receive
funding anyway. Regardless of the reason, federal spending must be used as a control
variable in these models. For spending on the county by the federal government, the total
amount of federal spending (in thousands) logged is included. These data were obtained
from the U.S. Census Bureau. This variable captures the impact of federal appropriations on
county sales tax rate increases. This will be used to determine whether counties that receive
greater federal funding are more likely to enact sales tax rate increases.
The per capita income of residents residing in a geographic location is often used as
an internal determinant in diffusion studies (Shipan and Volden, 2006; Berry and Berry,
1990; Boehmke and Witmer, 2004) or economic studies that examine competition among
local governments (e.g., Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001). This is because a government’s
wealth may influence its policies. On the one hand, a lower per capita income in a location
can be a barrier to governmental policy adoption due to a lack of resources. On the other,
when a geographic unit has a larger income, there are more resources to pursue policies.
There is a plausible difference in the way wealthier and poorer counties pursue sales
tax rate increases. Counties with higher levels of per capita income may be more likely to
adopt tax rate increases, as wealthier counties adopt changes more frequently in order to
capture the additional available revenue from its population. The poorer a jurisdiction is,
however, the less likely it will be to raise taxes and pursue other options to generate revenue
(Henrekson, 1993). Due to these reasons, per capita income should be controlled as an
internal determinant. To use as a measure of economic development and wealth, the per
capita income of each family in individual counties was included. The data for this variable
were obtained from the Missouri Census Data Center. This will test the idea that a county is
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bound by its economy when adopting sales tax rate increases. For this variable, the
coefficient is standardized when used to test the conditional hypothesis.
The size of a government’s retail sales often indicates its capacity to generate
revenue, its relationship with the private sector, and other economic demographics, all of
which may be a determinant of policy adoption (Berry and Berry, 1990). This study
recognizes that retail sales may also be impacted by sales tax rates, meaning that endogeneity
may be an issue. Therefore, additional models to determine if this would be an issue for
modeling were included. No such effect was found (p=.114). Specifically, the amount of
economic development that exists within a government may impact its propensity to adopt
or change its policies. On one hand, for sales taxes, minimal retail sales would make
policymakers more likely to raise revenue by raising sales taxes. For example, when a
government considers raising the taxation rate, it is often considering changing its
expenditure levels. The larger or wealthier a government is, the more funding alternatives it
might have. On the other, raising the sales tax rate would mean that more revenue could be
obtained through taxation, thus making it a preferable action to policymakers. Therefore, if
this holds true, one could expect that a government’s demand for services would increase
the more the county has developed economically (Henrekson, 1993). The retail sector size
variable is measured by the total dollar amount (in thousands) of revenue generated from
retail sales transactions in a given county in a given year, logged. This variable was obtained
from the U.S. Census Bureau. This will be used to assess whether or not a county’s retail
sector impacts tax rate increases.
Partisanship composition of a geographic area can impact policies. Electoral
considerations, in short, “affect which policies are ultimately enacted as well as the
provisions of these policies” (Karch, 2007, 4). In diffusion studies, researchers often theorize
that politics influences policy adoption (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson, 2004;
Shipan and Volden, 2008; Berry and Berry, 1990). Moreover, studies that examine strategic
tax competition between states also rely on political dimensions (e.g., Chirinko and Wilson,
2013) as a predictor of tax rate changes or how jurisdictions interact with one another. States
composed more of a specific ideology or one political party will adopt certain policies
aligned with the party’s belief system (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson, 2004).
Theoretically, policymakers adopt policies favorable to the party composition of their
electorate.
A county’s electorate composition or ideology of the government can influence
whether or not a tax is raised. Specifically, more liberal counties (or with a higher
Democratic composition of the electorate) will be more likely to raise sales tax rates.
Conversely, more conservative (or with a higher Republican electoral composition) counties
would be less likely to raise sales tax rates. To use as a measure of a county’s electoral
composition, the percentage of the population of each Missouri county that voted for the
Republican Party in the previous US presidential elections (2004 and 2008) was included.
The vote returns for each county were obtained from the Missouri Secretary of State’s
website. Presumably, this will determine if there are any differences in the number of sales
tax rate increases in counties with a higher vote percentage for the Republican presidential
candidate.
Additionally, fiscal stress was used, which measures the total assessed property value
of the county. Presumably, a decrease in the amount of assessed property tax, the more likely
a county would be to need additional revenue from sales tax. This is similar to Sjoquist et
al.’s (2007) research that relied on a change in the property tax base from the previous year.
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This study also relies on owner occupied housing. This measure was used because
those individuals who rent would be less likely to feel the burden of an increased tax
(Sjoquist et al. 2007). Additionally, this article examines whether or not a county houses a
major university, a variable used also by Sjoquist et al. (2007). Presumably, counties that
have universities have a unique demographic that may be different from a normal county. A
variable that is an indicator of whether or not a county has access to an interstate highway
was also included. The underlying logic here is that it is easier for residents to shop in other
counties due to ease of access to interstate highways (Sjoquist et al., 2007).
This study also examines whether or not a county shares a border with another state.
Counties may be more reluctant to adopt a sales tax if they share a border with another state
because of their increased concern for shopping across the border (Sjoquist et al. 2007). The
study also relies on the percentage of the population within a county living below the poverty
level. Presumably, counties that have higher poverty may be more fiscally stressed and have
less of a tax base, while low poverty counties may have the potential to generate more
revenue through taxes. Finally, this article examines multiple demographic control variables
used by the Sjoquist et al,. (2007) study. First, the percentage of the population that is
Caucasian (% White) non-Hispanic was used. This measure was used by Sjoquist et al.,
(2007) as a demographic control variable. Additionally, the portion of the population over
65 was also examined, in line with Sjoquist et al., (2007). Finally, a county that is rural as
opposed to urban may engage in economic competition differently. For example, urban
counties with a large number of cities may have a more professionalized staff, may have
additional revenue or can obtain additional revenue from taxes, or may be less susceptible
to competition than the larger urban counterparts. In Missouri, several counties house larger
metropolitan areas, making it important to control for these counties. Therefore, this study
controls for the county, relying on a dichotomous variable to capture whether or not a county
is urban or rural. If a county is below 50,000 in population, it is coded as 0; if higher, it is
coded as 1. This is the U.S. Census Bureau’s designation for an urban or rural county.
Internal Determinants Hypothesis: Internal county characteristics impact the sales tax
behavior of counties.
Interaction Effects (Internal and External Factors)
In addition to the external and internal factors mentioned in the previous sections, it
is likely that external and internal factors may work in conjunction with one another.
Scholars often include interaction models when there is the potential for conditional
relationships to be present. A conditional relationship exists when the impact of an
independent variable on the dependent variable is conditioned by the presence of another
variable (Brambor et al., 2006). Conditional relationships have also been used in policy
diffusion studies (e.g., Shipan and Volden, 2008; Mitchell and Stewart 2014; Mitchell and
Petray, 2016). For example, the neighbor variable has been shown to interact with measures
such as population, which assess whether or not smaller or larger counties are more
susceptible to certain policies (e.g., Mitchell and Stewart, 2014; Shipan and Volden, 2008),
or income measures, which determine whether or not higher income (as opposed to lowincome counties) are more susceptible to certain policies.
In this study, two interaction models are included: neighbors x income and neighbors
x retail. These are multiplicative variables of the aforesaid internal income and retail sales
variable and the neighbors external variable. For the latter and the former, this study posits
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that the effect of economic competition will be dependent on the economic strength of a
county’s neighbors.
Interaction Hypothesis: Sales tax behavior of counties will be impacted by a combination of
the internal county economic characteristics and the external behavior of bordering counties.
Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of each variable used in this study. The table
reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of each variable. These show
both the internal and external determinants used in this study. Table 2 shows the correlation
coefficients for each variable. According to this table, multicollinearity is not a major issue
for the models employed in this study, with the exception of a correlation between housing
and % white (r=.67), fiscal stress and federal spending (r=.848), and population and several
variables. Additional models were run, and the results did not significantly change.
Alternative models that omit federal funding and retail sales were tested, and the results
remained stable. These results are not reported due to space constraints.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Variables
Variable
Sales Tax Rate
Change
Proportion

Mean

SD

Min

Max

0.0005

0.0038

-0.005

0.1

0.164

0.199

0

1

Neighbor

0.332

4.26

0

100

% White

92.8871

7.9317

42.1

98.8

Over 65

16.4231

3.5273

7.2

29.6

Poverty

17.8

5.0257

5.8

29.3

20960.84

3469.73

14752

35143

Housing

72.373

6.822

44.6

84

University

0.0174

0.1308

0

1

Interstate

0.3478

0.4766

0

1

% GOP

60.8195

7.9447

16

76.3

Border

0.4087

0.4919

0

1

10.0143

1.081

7.6742

13.8233

4.7903

1.599

1.411

9.5729

456.9108

1447.272

19.5

11614

Per Capita Income

Population (l)
Retail Sales (l)
Fed Funding
Urban
Fiscal Stress
Income x
Neighbor
Retail x Tax

0.1689

0.3749

0

1

7.47E+08

2.39E+09

1.95E+07

2.53E+10

0.2703

0.0934

0.0311

0.6746

5721.789

64397.44

0

1799000
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Table 2 Correlation Coefficients for Variables
Tax

DV

Neighbor

Tax

1

DV

0.025

1

Neighbor

0.003

0.017

1

%White

0.024

0.004

-0.055

0.095
0.111

Over65

-0.01

Poverty

0.022

Income

0.019

0.068

-0.033

Housing

0.01

0.028
0.064
0.088

University
Interstate
%GOP
Border
Population(1)
Retail(1)
Fed Spend
Urban
Fiscal Stress

0.012
0.025
0.045
0.023

0.071
0.008
0.016
0.013

Over
65

Poverty

Income

Housing

University

Interstate

1

-0.005

0.522

1

0.055

-0.047

0.234

1

-0.154

0.361

-0.735

1

-0.059

0.675

0.484

-0.216

-0.044

1

-0.005

-0.132

0.04

0.193

-0.302

-0.027

-0.404

-0.295

0.377

-0.34

0.194

1

-0.025

0.332

0.188

-0.017

-0.206

0.149

-0.159

-0.21

0.039

-0.209

0.041

-0.025

0.143

-0.15

-0.108

0.094

0.083

0.019

-0.532

-0.65

-0.183

0.456

-0.422

0.321

0.381

0.026

0.027

-0.452

-0.085

0.353

-0.459

0.284

0.302

0.009

-0.003

-0.615

-0.052

0.312

-0.348

0.15

0.233

0.035

-0.014

-0.36

-0.275

0.553

-0.31

0.33

0.239

0.034

-0.009

-0.504

-0.16

0.47

-0.268

0.26

0.291

Urban

Fiscal
Stress

0.094
0.022

-0.03

%White

0.201
0.389

0.485
0.284
0.489
0.302

1

Interaction Effects
%GOP

Border

Pop (1)

%GOP

1

Border

-0.056

1

Pop(1)

-0.208

0.073

1

Retail
(1)

Fed
Spend

Retail(1)

-0.014

0.103

0.736

1

Fed Spend

-0.361

0.118

0.572

0.446

1

Urban

-0.231

0.143

0.718

0.419

0.458

1

Fiscal
Stress

-0.414

0.154

0.665

0.505

0.848

0.555
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Table 3 Models of Tax Rate Change within Missouri Counties (2004 - 2010)
Competition

Competition
(zeroinflated)

Lagged
Competition

Referendum

Conditional
Income

-0.0121

-0.0124

-0.0275

1.0027

- 2.6895*

-0.031

-0.031

-0.067

-0.059

-1.138

0.0232

0.0233

0.025

1.0407

0.0237

-0.016

-0.016

-0.016

-0.039

-0.016

-0.0272

-0.031

-0.0312

1.0181

-0.0269

-0.024

-0.024

-0.023

-0.06

-0.024

- 0.0550*

- 0.0442*

- 0.0563*

0.8549*

- 0.0455*

-0.019

-0.019

-0.019

-0.038

-0.022

- 0.0001*

-0.0001

- 0.0001*

0.1

- 0.0001*

0

0

0

0

0

Housing

0.007

0.0094

0.0149

0.957

0.0046

-0.013

-0.013

-0.013

-0.028

-0.014

University

0.6358

0.6425

0.5792

3.7378

0.5698

-0.397

-0.392

-0.388

-3.427

-0.394

0.149

0.1936

0.1898

0.9567

0.1897

-0.13

-0.129

-0.128

-0.322

-0.136

- 0.0244*
-0.009

- 0.0242*
-0.009

- 0.0252*
-0.009

0.997
-0.021

- 0.0235*
-0.009

Neighbors

%White

Over 65

Poverty

Income

Interstate

% GOP

Border

Population
(1)

Retail
Sales (1)

Fed
Spending
Urban

Fiscal
Stress
Income x
Neighbor
Retail x
Tax

N
Pseudo
R^2
Log
Likelihood
LR
x^2(11)

Conditional
Retail
-0.0137
-0.035
0.021
-0.015
0.0016
-0.023
-0.0357
-0.021
0
0
-0.0071
-0.013
0.5
-0.383
0.2105
-0.131
-0.0128
-0.009

Sales Tax
Rate
Model

Sales Tax
Change
Model

-2.3723

-1.48E-06

-4269312

0

1.30e+07*

0

-4288920

0

3.72e+07*

0

-6695550

0

-29902.2

0

-5530016

0

21446.82*

2.65E-08

-9461.988

-8.71E-08

2154808

0

-3838078

0

1.28e+09*

0

-1.33E+08

-0.001

5.37E+07

0

-4.00E+07

0

1.63e+08*
3.34e+07)

0
0

1.63e+08*
33400000

0

0.0173

0.007

0.0489

1.1192

0.0275

-0.0392

-0.115

-0.114

-0.113

-0.296

-0.114

-0.113

0.2189

0.2012

0.2261

2.0426*

0.1855

0.3525*

2.78e+08*

0
0

0

-0.131

-0.13

-0.129

-0.649

-0.131

-0.132

36000000

-0.0167

-0.0202

0.0047

0.7205*

-0.0173

- 0.8505*

3.75e+07*

0
0

-0.054

-0.053

-0.053

-0.105

-0.053

-0.145

17000000

0

0

0.0001

1.0001

0

-0.0001

815598.1*

0.00000012

0
-0.3205

0
-0.3047

0
-0.2006

0
1.1687

0
-0.3224

0
-0.3161

-3.4E-07
0

-0.25

-0.247

-0.242

-0.627

-0.247

-0.241

-26271.27
93800000
73200000

-3.32E-11

-5.35E-11

-4.91E-11

1

-1.4E-11

2.3E-11

____

-1.48E-06

-1.13E-10

-1.13E-10

-9.34E-11

-1.6E-10

-1.2E-10

-9E-11

____

0

____

____

____

____

0.0001*

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

0

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

14.7081*

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

-2.379

____

____

0

780

780

779

549

780

780

781

778

0.0236

____

.0.0303

____

____

____

____

0.01

-763.51

-763

-768.42

-383.14

-760.26

-744.01

-16614.78

____

204

165

199

211.8
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Table 3 shows the results of the multiple models used in this study. Model 1 examines
the competition model. Of primary interest in this model is the neighbor variable, which will
allow for the examination of whether economic competition is (or is not) occurring. This
model will also be used to examine the effects of the internal determinants. Model 2 is the
zero-inflated negative binomial model. This is to control for the large number of zeros
present within this study. Model 3 is the competition spatial lag model which includes the
lagged effects for the neighbor variable. Model 4 is a duration model that examines the
factors that increase a county’s risk for adopting a sales tax referendum. Model 5 is the
conditional economic competition model that captures the interaction variables (neighbor x
per capita income), which will help determine if the effect of the neighbor variable on sales
tax rate increases varies across income levels. For the interaction model, the per capita
income variable is standardized. Model 6 examines an interaction between retail sales and
the sales tax rate, and Model 7 examines the factors that influence the sales tax rate of
individual counties. Model 8 examines the factors that cause sales tax rate changes between
years.
Analysis of the models suggests that the factors that influence sales taxes are
complex. The neighbor variable was insignificant in all models (except conditional income),
but significant when it interacted with income in the conditional model. Interaction terms
are difficult to interpret; Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the interaction term
between per capita income and neighbors, and its impact on sales tax rate increase adoption.
The x-axis represents per capita income ranging from the lowest per capita income value of
14,752 to the highest value (see Table 1 for the descriptive statistics). The y-axis represents
the predicted number of sales tax increase adoptions. The different lines represent the
differences in how per capita income interacts with sales tax rate increases as the number of
neighbors the county has that have previously adopted a sales tax rate increase. Thus, Figure
1 represents the likelihood of adopting a sales tax rate increase as the per capita income of
the county increases for each per capita income level. The first change is at the 37,000 mark,
after which this value continues to increase. The graph shows the greatest impact for the
counties that have the lowest number of adopting neighbors. Thus, those counties that have
0-2 adopting neighbors are more likely to adopt sales tax rate increases when the higher per
capita income neighbors adopt them. This is evidence to suggest that when considering
adopting sales tax rate increases, counties do not (or only minimally) pay attention and react
to their neighbors.
When examining the interaction effects in Table 3, the relationship is dynamic and
complex. Specifically, the more neighboring counties that adopt tax rate increases, the less
likely the county in question is to increase its own taxes, depending on the county’s per
capita income level. For sales tax rate increases, poorer counties are more likely to copy
what their neighbors are doing. That is, if their neighbors adopt tax increases, the poorer
counties are more responsive. However, wealthy counties are less affected by other counties.
In terms of per capita income, the impact of a county’s neighbors on its decision to alter its
sales tax rate decreases as per capita income increases. This is likely because poorer counties
have more fear of losing revenue from their neighbors’ activities. Wealthier counties are less
influenced, or they weigh the effect of their neighbors as minimal.
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Table 4 Factor Change in the Expected Change of the Variables
Variable
P-Value
Factor
%
Change
Increase

SD

Neighbors

0.695

0.9880

0.9576

3.5808

% White

0.141

1.0235

1.1609

6.4194

Over 65

0.253

0.9732

0.9101

3.4658

Poverty

0.004*

0.9465

0.7661

4.8481

Income

0.044*

0.9999

0.8125

3141.7382

Housing

0.605

1.0070

1.0454

6.3802

University

0.109

1.8885

1.0881

0.1329

Interstate

0.251

1.1607

1.0725

0.4699

% GOP

0.006*

0.9759

0.8468

6.8178

Border

0.881

1.0174

1.0085

0.4883

Population (1)

0.095

1.2447

1.2358

0.9670

Retail Sales (1)

0.758

0.9834

0.9752

1.4981

Fed
(1)

0.864

1.0000

1.0236

875.1424

Urban

0.200

0.7258

0.8936

0.3509

Fiscal Stress

0.769

1.0000

0.9600

1.2288e+09

Spending

The (l) signifies that the variable is logged. P-Value represents the probability value of the
original model. % Increase represents the percent change in the expected count for a unit
increase in X. % SD increase represents the percent change in the expected count for a
standard deviation increase in X. SD is the standard deviation of the variable.
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Figure 1 Per Capita Income and Neighboring County Interaction Term

In the competition model, there were also three internal county determinant control
variables that were found to impact tax rate increases: poverty, per capita income, and the
percentage of the county’s Republican vote share. Counties with higher levels of per capita
income are more likely to adopt tax rate increases. Table 4 presents the factor change in each
variable for the competition model. Since the negative binomial regression is non-linear, the
percentage change is a more interpretable statistic. According to Table 4, for each additional
one thousand dollars in per capita income, there is a .99 increase (or a .8125 standard
deviation increase) in the expected count number of sales tax rate increases, holding all other
independent variables constant.
In addition, counties with greater percentage vote for the Republican Party’s
presidential nominee in 2004 and 2008 were less likely to adopt tax rate increases.
According to Table 4, for each percentage increase in vote for the Republican Party, there
is a .975 decrease in the change of the expected count of sales tax increases. Turning to
poverty, a percentage increase in the poverty level of counties decreases the expected count
of sales tax increases by .946. For the zero-inflated model, the results are similar, except per
capita income is not significant. According to the results of the lagged model, these variables
are also significant. For the referendum model, poverty, population, and retail sales are all
significant. In the conditional retail model, population and retail sales are all significant.
Finally, for the sales tax rate model, % White, Over 65, Income, University, % GOP, border,
population, retail sales, and federal spending are all significant.
Discussion
The analysis provides insight for how policies diffuse through local government and
- 17 -
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sorts out ways by which county governments do and do not enact increases in their sales tax
rates. The analysis shows sales tax increases can best be thought of as resulting from a
combination of external and internal factors. Externally, the conditional economic
competition hypothesis examined the effect of neighbors on sales tax rate increases and how
it varies across income levels. Specifically, the adoption of a sales tax increase is further
dependent upon the county’s per capita income, as wealthier counties are more resistant than
poorer counties to adopting increases when their neighbors do. This result is consistent with
the literature that found economic competition as having an impact (Brueckner, 2000;
Boehmke and Witmer, 2004; Berry and Baybeck, 2005), but the effect is not as direct as it
was in the previous studies; specifically, there was a conditional economic competition
effect (Shipan and Volden 2008). Wealthier counties respond to their neighbors less when
they implement tax rate increases, while poorer counties respond to their neighbors more.
This could be because wealthier counties perceive the threat of having neighbors with higher
or lower tax rates as less of a concern than poorer counties. That is, they consider their
citizens unlikely to go to another county with lower tax rates to engage in sales transactions.
Likewise, they may consider the threat of their neighbors being able to generate more
revenue through higher rates as minimal. Poorer counties, on the other hand, respond to their
neighbors’ increasing tax rates. This is likely because they feel they are susceptible to losing
revenue to other counties. As revenue generation and balancing the budget become greater
concerns in the future, counties will increasingly rely on taxation; these results illustrate just
how they might be expected to do so.
The results also show that several internal determinants influence the adoption of
sales tax increases, confirming many of this study’s internal determinant hypotheses. The
per capita income impacted sales tax rate changes in several of the models. This finding
comports with many of the studies which theorize that a government’s income influences its
policies (Boehmke and Witmer 2004; Berry and Berry 1990, 1992; Mooney, 2001; Bouche'
and Volden, 2011). One could contend that poorer counties would be more likely to increase
their tax rates to gain more revenue or that policymakers would be more reluctant to raise
taxes in poor geographical areas. However, in this study, the latter was not the case. This
could be because poorer counties that need additional revenue may be less cognizant or have
less capability of raising their tax rates. While counties can determine their own sales tax
rates, a more resourceful government might be more capable of understanding the need for
(and potential pitfalls to) raising their sales tax rates. It could also be that the fiscal capacity
of the populace is not reflective of the capacity of the government. Since local governments
in Missouri have discretion in generating their own revenue through sales taxes, wealthier
counties may be better able to adjust their policies that create revenue.
The Republican vote share had a significant relationship in several of the models.
This is consistent with many of the studies that hypothesize (or control for) the impact of
partisanship or ideology on policies (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 2004;
Shipan and Volden 2008; Berry and Berry 1990; Mooney 2001). The more Republican
counties (as measured by support for the GOP presidential nominee) adopt tax rate increases
less frequently than their Democratic counterparts. This suggests that policymakers are
cognizant of their constituents’ preferences on tax issues. The Republican Party generally
favors lower taxes and less government intervention in economic matters. Thus,
policymakers who have more constituents that voted Republican are less likely to adopt tax
rate increases, possibly for reelection considerations. This could be exacerbated by the fact
that many local elections in Missouri are partisan based.
- 18 -
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Finally, poverty was also significant in several of the models presented. Specifically,
higher amounts of poverty led to fewer sales tax rate increases. This is either because
policymakers are less likely to increase taxes in poor economic times and feel that they are
less capable of generating revenue from higher poverty citizens, or because areas that are
higher in poverty lack governments that are capable of remedying poor economic
circumstances.
The percentage of white population and the over 65 variables were significant in the
sales tax rate model. This suggests that there are additional processes occurring when
policymakers are considering the sales tax rates. Given the variation in these findings, it is
imperative that future studies consider multiple models.
Conclusion
This study examined the diffusion of sales tax rate increases among counties in
Missouri. Arguing that economic competition influences sales tax rate increases, multiple
hypotheses were tested using a regression analysis. Specifically, this study tested the
following hypotheses: competition, spatial lagged competition, referendum, conditional
competition income, conditional competition retail, sales tax rate change, and internal
determinants. This study found that, for Missouri counties, the conditional economic
competition income hypothesis was supported, in addition to multiple internal factors that
were hypothesized to influence sales tax rate increases. The conditional economic
competition hypothesis suggests that the effect of neighboring counties on sales tax rate
increases varies across income levels. This means that wealthier counties behave less
competitively than their smaller counterparts, meaning that smaller counties may be
disadvantaged by having to compete more with their larger counterparts. This competition
is even more difficult because these counties likely have fewer resources. Thus, the
devolution of policies from states to localities may exacerbate regional inequalities among
counties. Additionally, we found that policymakers are also responding to internal
conditions within their county and that external competition is not the only factor that they
consider.
Despite this study’s findings, it has several limitations. First, while Missouri does
provide an arguably adequate representative state to examine county diffusion, future studies
are needed to explore if these findings are similar in other states. Second, while the years in
this analysis did provide variation in sales tax rate increases, capturing more years could
reveal additional effects. Third, while this study included multiple variables to use as
measures of diffusion, additional variables not used in this study may further scholars’
understanding of diffusion processes. Future studies should examine other variables, such
as county-level politics, government type, professionalism of government, and the presence
of additional taxes, such as property or use taxes. Finally, it should be noted that the time
frame of this study is within a period of recession. Different results could emerge from
studies that occur within a non-recession period.
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